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This paper evaluates the impact of the Thailand Village 
and Urban Revolving Fund on household expenditure, 
income, and assets. The revolving fund was launched in 
2001 when the Government of Thailand promised to 
provide a million baht (about $22,500) to every village 
and urban community in Thailand as working capital 
for locally-run rotating credit associations. The money 
—about $2 billion in total—was quickly disbursed to 
locally-run committees in almost all of Thailand’s 74,000 
villages and more than 4,500 urban (including military) 
communities. By May 2005, the committees had lent a 
total of about $8 billion, with an average loan of $466.
Using data from the Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys 
of 2002 and 2004, each of which surveys almost 35,000 
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of a larger effort in the department to understand the cost-effectiveness of rural financial institutions. Policy Research 
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worldbank.org.  
households, the authors find that the borrowers were 
disproportionately poor and agricultural. A propensity 
score matching model finds that Fund borrowing in 
2004 was associated with, on average, 1.9 percent more 
income, 3.3 percent more expenditure, and about 5 
percent more ownership of durable goods. These results 
are broadly consistent with the results from instrumental 
variables models (where the identifying instrument was 
the inverse of village size), which however show a smaller 
(marginal) effect. Households that borrowed both from 
the revolving fund and from the Bank of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives gained substantially more in 
terms of higher income than those who borrowed from 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In 2001, the government of Thailand launched the Thailand Village and Urban Revolving Fund (VRF) 
program, which aimed to provide a million baht (about $22,500) to every village and urban community in 
Thailand as working capital for locally-run rotating credit associations.1
Thailand has almost 74,000 villages and over 4,500 urban (including military) communities, so the 
total injection of capital into the economy envisaged by the “million baht fund” amounted to 78 billion baht, 
equivalent to about $1.75 billion, making it the most ambitious  of the estimated 120,000 microfinance 
initiatives anywhere in the world.
   
2
                                                            
1 The average exchange rate during 2001 was Bht44.51/$, which implies that a million baht are equivalent to $22,468.  
The exchange rate as of mid-July 2007 was Bht31.23/$, which would value a million baht at $32,020; this is the  
exchange rate that we use throughout the rest of the paper.  
 
2 Estimated number of microfinance initiatives is from Kaboski and Townsend (2009), p.10. 
  The program was put into place rapidly.  By the end of May 2005 the VRF 
committees had lent a total of 259 billion baht ($8.3 billion at the July 2007 exchange rate of Baht 31.23/$) to 
17.8 million borrowers (some of whom borrowed more than once).  This represents an average loan of $466.  
The total repayment of principal amounted to 168 billion baht, leaving outstanding principal of 91 billion 
baht.   
In this  paper we ask a narrowly focused question: Has the VRF had an impact on household 
incomes, spending, and asset accumulation, and, if so, how large are these effects?   An answer to this 
question is necessary, but not sufficient, to help the Government of Thailand determine whether the program 
should be expanded or revised, and to help governments of other countries determine whether they should 
introduce or expand similar microcredit schemes.  In order fully to address these policy issues, one would also 
need information on the costs of the program.  A complete cost-benefit analysis of the Thailand Village Fund 
would be highly desirable, but goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
The VRF represents a policy experiment on a grand scale, but it is not the only major source of 
household credit, even in rural areas.  The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) has an 
extensive network of rural lending.  So it is appropriate to ask what additional role the VRF has played, an 
issue that we also address in this paper. 
We summarize the relevant details of the VRF program in section 2, set out our general approach in 
section 3, describe the data employed in the impact evaluation in section 4, and in the subsequent sections 
explain the methodology and report the results of the impact evaluation using propensity score matching 
(section 5), instrumental variables (section 6), and panel data methods (section 7).  The paper ends with a 
short set of conclusions in section 8. 
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2.  The Thailand Village Revolving Fund 
 
The Thailand Village Revolving Fund became operational very rapidly.  Inaugurated in 2001, Village and 
Urban Community Fund Committees (henceforth “Village Fund Committees”) had been formed in 92% of 
the villages and urban communities in Thailand by 2002, and much of the money had been disbursed.  By 
May 2005, 99.1% of all villages had a Village Fund in operation and 77.5 billion baht, representing 98.3% of 
the originally scheduled amount, had been distributed to Village Fund Committees (Arevart 2005). 
   Although the initial working capital came from the central government, the Village Funds are locally 
run, and have some discretion in setting interest rates, maximum loan amounts, and the terms of loans; some 
require, or at least encourage, savings deposits as a condition for borrowing.  The Village Fund Committees 
process loan applications; households borrow and repay with interest; and the money is lent out again.  The 
Village Fund Committees do not handle money directly; this is done by a number of intermediaries, of which 
the most important are the Government Savings Bank (GSB), which operates mostly in urban areas, and the 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), which operates only in rural areas and semi-
urban communities.   
  There are five steps that must be taken in order for a Village Fund to become operational: 
(a).    The village first sets up a local committee to run the fund and to determine the lending criteria 
(interest rate, loan duration, maximum loan size, and objectives).   
(b)    The properly-established committee then opens an account at the BAAC (which has about 700 
branches) or another "facilitator", and the government deposits a million baht into the account. 
(c)    The local Fund committee sifts through loan applications and determines who may borrow and 
under what conditions (interest rate, duration, etc.). 
(d)    The borrowers go to the BAAC (or other facilitator) to get access to the loans.  Each borrower 
must open an account – the minimum balance, if it is at the BAAC, is 100 baht – to which their 
loan is transferred. 
(e)    The borrower repays the loan with interest.  This requires him or her to visit a BAAC branch 
(or that of another facilitator); the borrower typically deposits the repayment directly into the 
village fund account. The BAAC provides a regular listing of transactions to each Village Fund. 
   A number of rules govern the establishment and operating procedures of the committee:  three 
quarters of the adults in the village must be present at the meeting where it is established; the committee 
should have about 15 members, half of them women; while there is some discretion about the amount lent 
per loan, it should not generally exceed 20,000 baht and should never exceed 50,000 baht; the loans must 
charge a positive interest rate; and it is recommended that loans have at least two guarantors. 
   The government rates Village Funds on a variety of efficiency and “social” criteria; in any given year, 
those that are rated AAA are provided with a “bonus” of a further Bht100,000 to add to their working capital.  Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 4 of 34 
In addition, Village Funds can borrow an additional million baht (or sometimes just half a million baht, see 
below) from the BAAC or other facilitator.  The size of this additional loan - i.e. half a million, or a million 
baht - is determined by the BAAC using its own (banker's) criteria.  Only Village Funds that are ranked 1st 
class or 2nd class by BAAC may borrow a million baht; the others (3rd class) may only borrow half a million 
baht.  The BAAC says that about 1% of these loans are overdue. The BAAC thus rates the managerial 
efficiency and potential of VRF Associations and may be intending gradually to withdraw from micro-lending 
by giving these village funds a space for competition to run village banks.  The BAAC recognizes that Village 
Fund Committees generally have an informational advantage in determining who is a good candidate for a 
loan.3
3.  Measuring the Impact of the Village Revolving Fund 
  Some of the more dynamic Village Funds are trying to become rural banks, which would potentially 
lead to an efficiency gain in that it would allow money to move from one village to another. 
 
 
The injection of loanable funds due to the VRF was substantial, averaging 2.7% of annual income, or 7.1% of 
income for the 38% of households who borrowed. Because a million baht was available for every village, 
regardless of size, the importance of the VRF declined with village size: in the smallest tenth of villages, VRF 
loans represented 7.9% of income, but just 1.1% of income in the largest decile of villages (Table 1). What 
impact might one expect from such a sizeable one-time infusion of cash? 
It is not self-evident that an injection of credit into a rural economy will have a measurable impact, or 
a positive impact.  If financial markets operate well – information is cheap and readily available, there are no 
policy distortions – then households should already have access to as much credit as they can productively 
use, and they would mainly substitute VRF credit for other sources of credit.  So for the VRF to have an 
impact on output, it must be predicated on the existence of market imperfections.  As a general proposition, 
this is not unreasonable, as credit markets have well-known informational asymmetries that in turn can lead 
to the inefficient allocation of credit, excessive loan default, monopoly profits for well-informed lenders, and 
even credit market collapse (Bardhan and Udry 1999, p.91).  The important point is that it cannot be 
assumed, a priori, that the VRF will necessarily have a major impact on household welfare. 
According to the Socio-Economic Survey undertaken in 2004, 24% of respondent households said 
that they did not borrow from the VRF because they had no need for credit, and a further 25% said that they 
did not borrow from the VRF because they did not want to take on more debt. We have assumed that in the 
absence of general equilibrium effects, the introduction of the VRF credit cannot be expected to have an 
                                                            
3 This process, however, could potentially squeeze out some existing borrowers who may have less access to BAAC 
loans, and yet not be able to get VRF loans for one reason or another.  Moreover, some VRFs may be inefficient for the 
following reasons: (i) lending to unqualified borrowers; (ii) favoring committee members; (iii) extending loans that  are 
larger than the limit (e.g. 50,000 baht); (iv) not insisting on repayment; (v) charging a lower interest rate; and (vi) landing 
for longer-than-allowed periods.  Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 5 of 34 
impact on the incomes or spending patterns of these households; however, this is not an innocuous 
assumption, because the very availability of easier credit may reduce the incentive for precautionary (“buffer 
stock”) savings, and allow even non-borrowers to spend more than they otherwise would have. 
Of those who did borrow, some may not have been credit-constrained, meaning that they had access 
to as much credit as they wanted, given the available price. They would then only have taken on VRF loans 
because they were cheaper.  In part this would produce an income effect – substituting cheap for expensive 
credit – but the lower price of credit would also provide an incentive to borrow more overall. The effect 
could be large; one in six VRF borrowers said that they borrowed from another source to repay the VRF 
loan, and the average annual interest rate paid on those sources was 46.0%; given an average VRF interest 
rate of 6.0%, this represents a gain of 40%; given the mean loan size of 16,183 baht, the interest saving would 
be equivalent to 4.9% of an average borrowing household’s annual income. While this probably an upper 
bound on the cost savings from VRF borrowing, it is enough to allow non-interest  consumption  for 
borrowers to rise by at least 6.1%, with no change in household income.   
Other VRF borrowers may have been credit-constrained, in the sense that they already wanted to 
borrow more at the available price of credit. Presumably existing lenders were reluctant to lend more due to 
prudential concerns, which in turn may have been justified, or may have resulted from asymmetric 
information. It is entirely possible that the village-level VRF would, in many cases, have better knowledge 
about the ability of village households to service loans than most outside lenders, and thus improve the 
efficiency with which credit is allocated. 
We do not have direct evidence on whether VRF loans substituted for other credit, or supplemented 
other borrowing. Kaboski and Townsend (2009), based on a rural sample of 800 households, find evidence 
that in 2003, households took on VRF loans without reducing their other borrowing. This sits well with the 
view that many households are credit-constrained, but of course is not inconsistent with the case of non-
constrained households responding to lower borrowing costs. 
Much microlending is seen as desirable because it allows households to invest more, and so raise 
their earnings, and certainly the VRF was originally viewed as a vehicle for promoting the development of 
non-farm enterprise. In this case the impact goes from loan to more investment to more income to more 
consumption. On the other hand, many households use credit for consumption purposes –  to smooth 
consumer spending over the course of a year, or make a lumpy purchases (including durable goods), or 
increase consumer spending now relative to in the future. In this case one would observe an increase in 
consumer spending without a corresponding rise in income.  Given that households are heterogeneous, and 
only some would borrow from the VRF for productive purposes, our presumption is that the VRF will have 
a stronger impact on consumption spending than on income. 
  Whether VRF loans were used for investment or for consumer spending, the effect is likely to be 
complicated by the fact that a number of credit schemes are already in place.  In rural areas, the most Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 6 of 34 
important is the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), which practices individual as 
well as group-based lending (mainly to support farming), mobilizes savings as part of financial intermediation, 
and is widely considered to be a successful rural finance institution (Yaron 1992, Fitchett 1999).  Therefore it 
is legitimate to wonder whether the VRF has an added value to rural households that the BAAC could not 
provide – are they substitutes or complements?  In other words, the relative effectiveness of both programs is 
an issue worth examining from the policy point of view, an issue to which we return in section 5. 
In short, our main task is to measure the impact of the VRF program on three outcome variables of 
interest: 
•  Expenditure per capita.  The measure of expenditure available is based on the Socioeconomic 
Surveys  of  2002 and 2004, and includes 56 categories of expenditure (and home production), 
including the rental value of housing, but does not include the rental value of the household’s durable 
goods or vehicles (for lack of data).   
•  Income per capita.  This measure includes 24 categories of income, and includes the rental value of 
housing (but not of durable goods). 
•  A number of measures of household assets, including whether the household has a washing 
machine, a VCR, or a motorized vehicle.  The SES-2004 did not collect information on the total 
value of household assets. 
But now we are faced with a methodological problem: VRF borrowers do not represent a random sample of 
the households (or adults) surveyed in the Socioeconomic Survey of 2004 – among other things, they are 
poorer and more rural.   
  To get around the problem of non-random assignment, we are obliged to turn to a number of 
econometric techniques.  These include propensity score matching (section 5) and instrumental variables 
(section 6), using data from the Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004.  These surveys also 
included a panel of rural households, which allows us to estimate the impact of the VRF using double 
differences, and instrumental variables with household fixed effects (section 7).  But before discussing the 
impact evaluation techniques and results, some additional description of the data is in order. 
 
4.  The Data 
 
The data for the impact evaluation come from the Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004.  The 
2004 survey interviewed 34,843 households (covering 116,444 people) throughout the country drawn from 
2,044 municipal “blocks” and 1,596 villages in 808 districts.  The data were collected in four rounds, spread 
throughout the year.  The survey collected a wide variety of socio-economic data, including relatively detailed 
information on household income and expenditure.  It used stratified random sampling with clustering; all the Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 7 of 34 
descriptive results presented in this paper apply the appropriate weights (unless otherwise indicated). The 
2002 survey used substantially the same questionnaire and covered 34,785 households. 
  An interesting feature of these two surveys is that they include a panel of 5,755 rural households.  An 
effort was made in 2004 to re-survey all 6,309 households that had been surveyed in rural areas in rounds 2 
and 3 of the 2002 socioeconomic survey.  This represents an annual attrition rate of 4.5%, which is relatively 
low.  A comparison between panel households and those who dropped out of the panel found no appreciable 
differences in the relevant variables (in 2002), allaying concerns about attrition bias. 
   The summary statistics in  Table 2  come from a special module that was included in the 2004 
socioeconomic survey and that asked all adult members of households about their experience with the VRF.  
By 2004, a sixth of all adults had borrowed at least once from the VF, with higher proportions of borrowers 
among the poor (defined as those in the poorest quintile, as measured by expenditure per capita) and among 
those in rural areas; in this respect, VRF lending differs sharply from the older “village bank” programs in 
Northeast Thailand analyzed by Coleman (2002), where the bulk of the loans, and gains, accrued to the 
wealthier villagers.  Adults in 38 percent of households had borrowed from the VRF by 2004. 
   Of those adults who did not borrow, less than one percent had been refused a VRF loan, although a 
further 4% thought that they would be turned down.  On the other hand, over a quarter of non-borrowing 
adults said they had no need to borrow, and almost a third said that they did not want to go into debt.  Poor 
households were less likely to indicate that they did not need to borrow, but more likely to be fearful to going 
into debt. 
   The average amount borrowed in the most recent VRF loan was 16,183 baht (about $518), and this 
was only slightly less than the amount requested on average.  The mean interest rate charged on VRF loans 
was 6.0 percent per year, but there was considerable variation, as Figure 1 shows: substantial numbers of 
Village Funds charged annual interest rates of 5, 3, or 12 percent.  The interest rate paid by poor, or rural, 
borrowers was essentially the same, or perhaps slightly lower, than that paid by other adults. 
Although the rhetoric surrounding the Village Revolving Fund program emphasized the importance 
of providing finance for processing and packaging, over half of all VRF borrowers said that they planned to 
use the money for relatively traditional agricultural purposes.  This effect was even more marked among poor 
and rural borrowers.  Borrowing is fungible, so this does not necessarily imply that spending on agricultural 
activities actually rose as a result of the implementation of the Village Fund program, but there is a 
dissonance between the reported uses of the borrowed funds and the original aspirations for the Fund. 
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Figure1.  Interest Rates Charged by Village Funds, 2004 
Source: Thailand Socio-Economic Survey 2004 
 
   Eight percent of VRF borrowers reported that they were overdue on repayments, and the 
proportions were similar for poor, and for rural, households.  However, a sixth of those who obtained VRF 
credit in turn borrowed elsewhere in order to repay their VRF loan.  The interest rates charged by those 
alternative sources of credit were high, averaging 46 percent (on an annualized basis).   
   Despite the challenges that some faced in repaying the VRF loans, seven out of ten borrowers said 
that their economic situation had “improved” as a result of the program and just 2 percent said that it had 
worsened.  However, less than a third of borrowers said that the VRF system should be left unchanged; 
substantial numbers wanted the loan amounts to be larger (34% of respondents), longer (34%), cheaper 
(37%), or to be focused more on the poor (25%). 
   In 2004, women were slightly less likely than men to have borrowed from the Village Fund: 15.5% of 
adult women borrowed from the fund, compared to the overall average of 16.6%.  Women asked for, and 
received, slightly smaller loans; paid a slightly higher interest rate; and were less likely to borrow to buy 
agricultural inputs or equipment.  However, in most other respects, female borrowers are indistinguishable 
from male borrowers, as may be seen by comparing the first and last columns of numbers in Table 2. 
   A 2005 survey undertaken in the northeast of Thailand by the Thailand Development Research 
Institute (TDRI) found that about 40% of households had borrowed from the VRF, and among those who 
borrowed, slightly over 90% said they were satisfied with the process.  There is, however, anecdotal evidence 
that in some cases the injection of credit has led villagers to borrow too much, leading to difficulties when the Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 9 of 34 
funds had to be repaid (Laohong 2006, Gearing 2001).  There have also been reports of corruption in the 
administration of the VRF in some scores of villages. 
The most rigorous study to date of the impact of the VRF uses data from the 2003 and earlier 
rounds of a panel of 960 households that Robert Townsend and his colleagues have been following for a 
number of years in four provinces of Thailand; 800 households were followed throughout 1997-2003, and 
this is the sample used in the study by Kaboski and Townsend (2009).  Although the sample size is relatively 
small, the survey is rich in detail on household financial assets and transactions.  Their most striking finding is 
that the proportion of household credit coming from “formal” sources (including the VRF) jumped from 
37% in 2001 to 69% in 2002, and was accompanied by little reduction in the use of other credit; in other 
words, at least as of 2003, VRF credit supplemented rather than replaced existing sources of credit.  
Although the VRF is widely used, and reported levels of satisfaction with it are high, this is no 
guarantee that it has had a measurable impact on the outcome variables of interest.  Some critics have argued 
that many VRF borrowers view the money more as a grant than a loan, in which case it might be expected to 
lead to a one-time increase in per capita expenditure and the value of household durables, but not raise 
income.  Defenders argue that the VRF has had an effect on productivity, raising income and, via higher 
income, boosting expenditures.  Yet others argue that the main effect of the VRF has been to substitute for 
other sources of credit, with very little net impact on real output, spending, or welfare.  To determine the 
truth in these arguments, a formal impact evaluation is required.  
 
5.  Propensity Score Matching 
 
Our first approach to measuring the impact of the VRF is by creating a quasi-experimental design that 
matches VRF borrowers with “otherwise identical” non-borrowers, and quantifies any difference in outcome 
variables between these two groups.  Formally, let  
Xi be a vector of pre-treatment covariates (such as age of head of household, location of household, 
and so on),  
Yi0  be the observed value of the outcome variable (such as expenditure) in the absence of the 
treatment,  
Yi1 be the observed value of the outcome variable for household i if it has been treated (i.e. it has 
borrowed from the VRF), and 
Ti be the treatment (equal to 1 if the household is treated, to 0 otherwise). 
 We want to measure τi ≡ Yi1-Yi0, but this is impossible, because an individual is either in the treatment group 
(so be observe Yi1) or the comparison group (so we observe Yi0), but never in both.  If we are willing to 
assume that households are “assigned” randomly to the treatment group, once we have conditioned on the 
covariates, then by a proposition first established by Rubin (1977), the average treatment effect (τ|T=1) is Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 10 of 34 
identified and is equal to τ|T=1,X averaged over the distribution of X|Ti=1.  In other words, we can measure the 
average impact of the VRF by taking each borrower, finding an identical non-borrower (conditioned on the X 
covariates), computing the difference in the outcome variable of interest, and taking its mean.   
This procedure would only be straightforward if there were just a few covariates; in practice the 
problem is more tractable if we can create a summary measure of similarity in the form of a propensity score.  
Let p(Xi) be the probability that unit i be assigned to the treatment group, and define  
     ). | ( ) | 1 Pr( ) ( i i i i i X T E X T X p = = ≡           (1) 
In practice, this probability – the propensity score – could be estimated using a logit or probit equation.   
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that conditional independence extends to the propensity score, so that 
treatment cases may be matched with comparison cases using just the propensity score.  Furthermore, the 
average treatment effect may be obtained by computing the expected value of the difference in the outcome 
variable between each treated household and the perfectly matched comparison household (as matched using 
the propensity score).  Perfect matching is not possible in reality, so in practice one needs to compute 
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τ           (2) 
where Yi is the observed outcome for the ith individual who is treated and Ji is the set of comparators for i.  
The comparators may be chosen with replacement – the approach we take – in which case the bias is lower 
but the standard error higher than without replacement.  We use single nearest neighbor matching, whereby 
one chooses the closest comparator, although other approaches are possible (Abadie et al. 2001); Dehejia and 
Wahba (2002) argue that the choice of matching mechanism is not as crucial as the proper estimation of the 
propensity scores. 
Broadly following an algorithm outlined by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we first estimated propensity 
scores by applying a probit model to a limited number of covariates.  We then sorted the observations by 
propensity score and divided them into strata sufficiently fine to ensure that there was no statistically 
significant difference in propensity scores between treated and non-treated households within each stratum.  
We confined this comparison to the area of “common support” – where the propensity scores of the treated 
and untreated overlap – and typically needed between 15 and 21 strata.  We then checked for the “balancing 
property,” which means that within each stratum we tested (using a 1% significance level) whether there was 
a difference in the covariates between the treated and non-treated group.  Our initial propensity score models 
were not well balanced, so we added covariates (including dummy variables for Thailand’s 76 provinces) and 
we were able to generate models that were adequately balanced.  For instance, when we confined our sample 
to rural areas, the propensity score model had 101 covariates, generated 13 strata, and produced 14 cases 
where covariates were not balanced.  This is acceptable, given that at a one percent level of statistical 
significance one would expect to find, erroneously, about 13 cases of imbalance (false negatives). Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 11 of 34 
   A listing of the variables used in estimating the propensity scores for 2004 is given in Table 3 (except 
for the provincial dummy variables).  The first thing to note is that on average VRF borrowers are 
substantially poorer than those who do not borrow from the VRF, whether measured by monthly 
expenditure per capita (2,549 baht vs. 4,286 baht) or income per capita (3,209 baht vs. 6,088 baht), or by 
access to subsidized medical care (93% have a 30 baht medical card, vs. 77% for non-borrowers).  Compared 
to non-borrowers, those who borrow from the VRF are more than twice as likely to be farmers and to be 
self-employed, they are more likely to live in the Northeast region, they have larger families, and there are 
more earners per household.  The important point here is that borrowers differ appreciably from non-
borrowers, at least unless one conditions on the covariates. 
   The estimate of the probit propensity score equation for the full sample is also shown in Table 3.  
The equation fits well enough and, as noted above, appears to be adequately balanced.  One of the more 
influential variables is the inverse of the number of households per village (or block): The Thai Village Fund 
initially provided a fixed amount to every village, irrespective of size, which means that households living in a 
large village are less likely to have access to these loans than those in a small village.  This effect shows clearly 




Given the propensity scores, it is then possible to match each treatment case with a nearby comparison case, 
and hence to estimate the impact of VRF borrowing.  The results are summarized in Table 4; the upper half 
of the table refers to 2004 (with separate propensity score equations for the full sample, for rural households 
only,  and for the panel), and the bottom half to 2002.  
  When propensity score matching is used with the full sample of households surveyed in 2004, VRF 
borrowing is associated with a statistically significant 3.3% more expenditure per capita and a not-quite-
significant 1.9% higher income per capita.  Translated into average increases (at the mean) this implies a rise 
in per capita spending of 84 baht per month and of income of 61 baht per month.  A reasonable 
interpretation is that VRF loans are partly, but not exclusively, functioning as consumer credit; they also 
appear to be working through the effect on income.  The results based on the 2002 data are comparable: VRF 
borrowing is associated with a 3.1% rise in income (t=1.90) and a 2.6% rise in expenditure (t=2.15). To put 
these numbers into perspective, the mean size of a VRF loan was 16,183 baht (Table 2), and mean monthly 
income per person was 4,987 baht (Table 1) in 2004. 
The increases reported in Table 4  are plausible.  The boost to income in 2004 represents an 
annualized rate of return of 4.5% on the amount borrowed (which averaged 16,183 baht).  However, these 
effects are only found when expenditure (or income) per capita is shown in log form; when measured in 
levels, the VRF has no statistically significant impact in these cases.  The use of the log of income (rather than Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 12 of 34 
its level) puts more emphasis to increases for poorer households, as the proportional effects (i.e. logs) are 
given more weight in these cases.  To explore this further, we divided households into quintiles based on the 
levels of expenditure per capita, and then applied propensity score matching (with a single nearest neighbor) 
to each category.  The striking result, shown in Table 5, is that the impact of VRF borrowing is only strong 
for the poorest quintile, a finding that holds both for 2002 and 2004.  It would thus be appropriate to 
categorize the VRF policy as “pro-poor.” 
It is instructive to breakdown the impacts further, for each major category of income; the results are 
shown in rows 8-14 in Table 7. More VRF borrowing is associated with more farm income (up 49%, albeit 
from a modest base of just 522 baht per capita per month) and more income from non-farm enterprises (up 
26%). On the other hand, VRF borrowing is not associated with higher wage or transfer income.  
One may also break down the impacts by consumer expenditure category (see rows 15-26 in Table 
7). There are substantial increases in spending on grain and meat, and also on vehicle operation, although this 
last effect is not quite statistically significant.  None of the other measured impacts are statistically significant. 
These results differ somewhat from those reported by Kaboski and Townsend (2009, Table 5), who found, 
for a sample of villages in central Thailand, that VFR credit raised spending on alcohol, and on repairs to 
homes and vehicles. 
The VRF appears to have the biggest impact in rural areas.  If the analysis is repeated for rural 
households only, the effect is a statistically significant 6.9% boost to expenditure and 4.3% increase in income 
in 2004 (upper panel of Table 4), although the comparable effects in 2002 were much smaller. 
There are minimal gender effects. For households that reported having a male head, VRF borrowing 
was associated with a 5.2% rise in expenditure and 4.8% increase in income. These figures are only marginally 
higher than those for female-headed households, where expenditure rose 5.0% and income by a (non-
significant) 2.8%, as shown in rows 31 and 32 of Table 7. 
  In addition to the effect on income or expenditure, it might also be expected that VRF borrowing 
would have an effect on the accumulation of household assets.  It is not possible to measure household gross 
or net assets using the Socioeconomic Survey data, but there is a listing of the major physical assets, of which 
some of the most important are given in Table 6.  There we see, for instance, that 64% of all households 
surveyed had a phone in 2004; the rate was 59% for VRF borrowers and 67% for non-borrowers.  We then 
used our propensity-score matching and found that, for instance, phone ownership among VRF borrowers 
was 5.4 percentage points higher than among comparable non-borrowers.  Similar effects were found for 
VCRs, fridges, washing machines, and motorized transport.  This, coupled with the smaller impact on income 
than on expenditure, suggests that VRF borrowing was used to some extent in order to get improved access 
to consumer and producer durables, despite the fact that fewer than 2% of households reported that this was 
the ostensible purpose of their VRF borrowing (see Table 2). 




How robust are these findings?  A number of useful checks are summarized in Table 7:  row 1 shows the 
basic result from Table 4, which is a 3.3% increase in expenditure per capita.  Using the same propensity 
score equation we first measured the sensitivity of the results to alternative matching methods.  Most of the 
results are of the same order of magnitude: stratification matching (i.e. matching within broader strata) shows 
a 4.2% impact of VRF borrowing on expenditure; kernel matching, which compares the treated case with all 
neighbors, but with high weights for near neighbors, shows an impact of between 1.8% (Gaussian kernel) and 
4.5% (Epanechnikov kernel).  Only caliper matching gives a radically different result – it compares all treated 
cases (i.e. VRF borrowers) to those with a propensity score within a radius of 0.001 – indicating, implausibly, 
that VRF borrowing reduced expenditure by 18%.  This may be because a substantial number of borrowers 
with high propensity scores were not matched, and so were excluded, because there were no comparators in 
the immediate vicinity.  However, this result does lead one to question the assertion by Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002) that the choice of matching mechanism is of secondary importance.  
A somewhat different check on the robustness of our results is to match treatment households with 
non-treatment comparators using direct nearest neighbor matching rather than first estimating propensity 
scores.  It is not clear that direct (“covariate”) matching represents an improvement, even in principle, over 
propensity-score matching, and it is computationally intensive, but if both approaches give similar results then 
one can have more confidence in the conclusions.  The results, for households living in rural areas (and using 
dummy variable for regions, rather than provinces) are shown in rows 6 and 7 of Table 7 and show that while 
VRF borrowing is associated with a statistically significant 7.6% increase in per capita spending as measured 
using propensity score matching; the effect is much smaller using direct matching – an increase of 1.3% if the 
direct match is based on a single nearest neighbor – and not statistically significant. 
We also re-estimated the results after deleting villages that were either very small (under 50 
households) or rather large (with at least 500 households). Perhaps surprisingly, the results are somewhat 
stronger, and show a 4.8% increase in expenditure and 3.7% rise in income due to the VRF (lines 27 and 28 
in Table 7). 
The most important maintained assumption in propensity score matching is that “the process by 
which individuals are assigned or assign themselves to treatment” is ignorable (DiPrete and Gangl 2004). That 
is, after removing the effects of observable variables, we may proceed as if subjects were randomly assigned 
to treatment. This is a strong assumption. In practice there are likely to be unobserved variables, such as 
motivation or ability, that simultaneously affect the outcome, and the assignment to treatment. By definition 
we cannot quantify the effects of this “hidden bias”. One solution, proposed by Rosenbaum (2002), is to test 
the sensitivity of the results to the introduction of a hypothetical “confounding variable” W, that affects the Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 14 of 34 
odds of being assignment to treatment. Let πi be the probability that unit i receives treatment, and Xi the 
observed covariates. Then the log odds ratio is given by 










= + ≤≤  − 
X  
Under the hypothesis of ignorability, γ=0 (or equivalently, Γ=1, where Γ≡e
γ). With higher values of Γ, 
propensity score matching will be less precise. Rosenbaum shows how to obtain significance levels (using a 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test) and new confidence intervals (if the treatment effects are additive) for different 
values of Γ. The results of estimating these Rosenbaum bounds for the log of expenditure per capita are 
shown in Table 8, and show that our results are not especially robust; if an unobserved variable were to cause 
the odds ratio of treatment assignment to vary by a factor of about 1.07, then our finding of a impact would 
no longer be statistically significant at even the 10% level. Although our results are sensitive to the 
assumption of ignorability, this potential loss of significance is, as DiPrete and Gangl (2004) rightly point out, 
just a worst-case scenario. 
  Our final robustness check is to estimate the effect of borrowing on income and consumption using 
a common impact model (Haughton and Khandker 2009). Let Yi measure the outcome, Xi be a vector of 
covariates, Ti measure the treatment under consideration (i.e. VRF borrowing), and εi represent a zero-mean 
error term, and estimate 
, 1,..., observations.
i C TC i i i Y T in α α βε = + ++ = X  
Then the estimate of the coefficient αTC should be able to measure the impact of the borrowing. The results 
are shown in Table 9, and use the same other covariates as in the propensity score matching (see Table 3). 
When the treatment is measured as a binary variable, set equal to 1 if the household borrows from the VRF, 
then the impact is to raise expenditure per capita by 2.3% - broadly in line with the 3.3% impact as measured 
using propensity score matching (Table 4); however, the estimated effect on income is nil. One may also 
measure the impact of the amount of borrowing, given that one is a borrower. The middle section of Table 8 
shows that an additional 100 baht of borrowing is associated with 83 baht more spending and 143 baht more 
income, figures that are on the high side, particularly for income, unless “lumpiness” in investment is a 
commonly binding constraint.  The estimates in the bottom panel of Table 8 imply that a 10% higher loan is 
associated with 1.4% more consumption or 1.8% more income, again rather large effects. The common 
impact model is less compelling than propensity score matching because it does not confine the estimates to a 
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The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
The VRF is not the only, or even necessarily the most important, source of credit for Thai households. The 
Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives has an extensive network of rural lending.  Of the 
households covered by the 2004 socioeconomic survey, 23% borrowed from the VRF only, 15% borrowed 
from both the VRF and BAAC, and 6% borrowed from the BAAC only.  These figures differ slightly from 
those presented earlier because they only refer to the two most important loans incurred by any given 
household.  But the fact that many households borrow both from the VRF  and the BAAC raises the 
possibility that our earlier results may be picking up the effect of BAAC borrowing and attributing it to VRF 
borrowing.   
We therefore applied our propensity score matching approach to borrowing from the BAAC, and 
report the results in Table 10.  For each comparison (i.e. row in Table 10) we estimated separate propensity-
score equations.  From Table 10  it is clear that those who borrowed from the BAAC in 2004 were 
comparably poor to, and somewhat more dependent on farm income than, VRF borrowers.   
   The first point to note is that, based on the results of the propensity-score matching analysis set out 
in Table 10, borrowing from the BAAC, with or without other loans, is associated with substantially higher 
expenditure per capita (+6.5%) and income per capita (+6.1%).  This effect is larger than that of borrowing 
from the VRF (expenditure per capita rises 3.3%, income per capita by 1.9%, as shown in Table 4).   
   The most striking finding is that the combination  of borrowing from the BAAC and VRF has 
particularly powerful effects, and is associated with 9.1% higher expenditure and 8.5% higher income.  Loans 
from these two sources appear to be complementary.  A plausible interpretation is that many households, 
particularly farm households, are credit constrained, even if they borrow from the BAAC; the VRF, by 
relaxing these constraints, enables them to boost their incomes.  It is noteworthy that borrowing from the 
BAAC but not VRF, or from the VRF but not BAAC, has a small and only marginally significant effect on 
expenditure levels and an even weaker effect on incomes. This hints at a real, but moderate, degree of 
“lumpiness” in investment, where the full return on using borrowed money is only obtained when the sum is 
large enough. 
The propensity score matching results appear, on balance, to show that VRF borrowing raised 
household income and expenditures on average, and that much of the productive effect operated in 
agriculture.  In the next section we use a different approach, instrumental variables, further to check the 
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6.  Instrumental Variables 
 
We are interested in finding an unbiased estimate of the impact effect – an estimate of γ – in an outcome 
equation of the form 
n i T Y i i i i ,..., 1 , . = + + + = ε β γ α X           (3) 
where Yi is the outcome of interest, Ti is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household borrows from the 
VRF, and the Xi variables are relevant covariates.  However, Ti is a “troublesome explanator” (Murray 2005) 
because it is likely correlated with εi: as the basic numbers in Tables 2 and 4 show, VRF borrowers are not a 
random sample of the population – they are poorer, spend less, and own fewer durable goods. 
  An unbiased estimate of γ may be found if one can construct an adequate participation (“first stage”) 
equation of the form 
  ), , ( i i i f T X Z =                 (4) 
where the instruments Zi should be strongly correlated with Ti (“instrumental relevance”) yet be uncorrelated 
with εi (“instrument exogeneity”).  Then the estimated value,  i T ˆ , is used in place of  i T  in equation (3). 
  We may think of the instrumental variables (IV) estimate of γ as reflecting the “marginal” impact of 
the treatment; that is, it measures the impact on expenditure (or income) of one more person borrowing from 
the VRF.  This differs from the propensity score matching measure, which quantifies the average impact 
across all those who are treated.  If treatment brings diminishing marginal returns, one might expect the 
impact, as measured using propensity score matching, to be larger than that measured using the instrumental 
variables approach. 
  The main practical problem with the IV approach is finding appropriate instruments, yet “the 
credibility of IV estimates rests on the arguments offered for the instruments’ validity” (Murray 2005, p.11).  
In our case there is one good candidate: the inverse of the size of the village.  A feature of the VRF is that it 
provided a million baht to each Village Rotating Fund, irrespective of the size of the village.  Thus the 
probability of obtaining a VRF loan (“participation”) is approximately in inverse proportion to the size of the 
village.  Our measure of the size of the village is the number of households, which is likely to be closely 
correlated with the theoretically ideal measure (the number of people eligible for VRF loans, which is the 
number of adults aged 20 and above). 
  The IV estimates of the impact of the VRF are summarized in Table 11.  In each case the first step 
equation is probit; an example, for the log of expenditure per capita, is shown in detail in Appendix Table A1.  
In all cases the influence of the instrument in the first-stage equations is highly statistically significant, clearly 
showing its relevance. 
  The second-stage equation is linear.  Where possible, estimation was done using maximum likelihood 
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procedure on the unweighted data.  In all cases the reported z-statistics have been adjusted to account for the 
fact that one is using  i T ˆ  rather than  i T  in the outcome equation. 
  The IV results in Table 11, for 2004, show a positive but not statistically significant impact of the 
VRF on expenditure and income.  In rural areas the measured effects are negative.  Curiously, the impact on 
farm income, and on non-farm income, are separately large and positive.  The results for 2002 show that VRF 
borrowing raised expenditure by 9.9%, and income by 8.4%, although the latter effect is not highly 
statistically significant. 
  These results are not particularly robust.  The middle rows of Table 11 show the effect on the IV 
estimates of adding other instruments.  The first instrument is “anydebt”, which equals 1 if the household in 
2004 has any outstanding debt.  This is strongly correlated with whether a household borrows from the VRF, 
but weakly associated with the outcome variable (e.g. simple correlation with expenditure per capita of -0.035; 
weighted correlation of -0.109).  The inclusion of this instrument raises the measured impact of the VRF to a 
statistically significant 16% for income and 20% for expenditure, levels that are certainly on the high end. 
  It might be objected that “anydebt” is not exogenous, if households borrow from the VRF when 
they would not otherwise have borrowed.  Alternatively one could use a measure of “non-VRF debt”, set 
equal to 1 if the household has debt other than VRF debt.  With this instrument the measured impact of VRF 
borrowing on household spending rises to an implausible 46%, but even here it might be argued that the new 
instrument is not truly exogenous. 
  Finally, we also add, as an instrument, the interest rate charged by the VRF.  It is plausible that a 
higher interest rate would deter borrowing – indeed, the weighted correlation coefficient is -0.054 – and be 
essentially unrelated to the log of expenditure per capita (correlation of 0.046).  The inclusion of this 
instrument raises the measure of the impact of VRF borrowing to unrealistically high levels.  But it is by no 
means a fully satisfactory instrument: when it is included, the sample size falls, because interest-rate 
information is only available for villages that have an operating VRF. 
  In sum, the results of our IV analysis are not very sharp and are partly contradictory.  It does seem 
reasonable to conclude, however, that the most satisfactory models just use the inverse of the village size as 
an instrument; and in this case, the marginal impact of the VRF on expenditure and income is minimal.  
Combined with the propensity score matching results, it appears that the VRF raises spending and income on 
average, but is experiencing diminishing returns at the margin. 
Our results are broadly in line with those found by Kaboski and Townsend (2006), who also used an 
instrumental variables approach, but with data from the 2003 and earlier rounds of a panel of 960 households 
surveyed in four rural provinces.  They  checked for robustness by applying a variety of econometric 
specifications (levels, changes, and estimates with and without outliers).  Their main findings are that greater 
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increase in income, and with an increase in agricultural investment as well as spending on fertilizer and 
pesticides.   
Kaboski and Townsend also found that VRF borrowing was associated with an apparent reduction 
in net household assets.  This might seem surprising, but could be due to mismeasurement (a farmer might 
have invested in drainage or field leveling, and this might not be picked up in survey questions), or because 
better access to credit reduces the need to hold assets, or because households overborrowed. 
 
7.  Panel Data 
 
An effort was made, in the socioeconomic survey of 2004, to re-survey half of the rural households that had 
been interviewed in 2002.  This produced a panel of 5,755 rural households for which information is available 
for both years.  The panel data allow us, in principle, to get a less biased measure of the impact of VRF 
borrowing, because one can eliminate unobserved variable bias, provided that the bias is linear and does not 
vary over time. It also helps that the introduction of the VRF was a “surprise”, in the sense that it was 
proposed and implemented swiftly, and households in 2002 could not easily adjust their behavior in 




The simplest way to use the panel data is by double differencing.  If, before the borrowing, income Yi 
depends on covariates Xi, then 
, . 0 , 0 , 0 , t i t i t i c a Y ε + + = X               (5) 
and afterwards 
  . . . 1 , 1 , 1 , t i t i i t i c T b a Y ε + + + = X             (6) 
with  . it i it µ η ε + =  Differencing gives 
. ) .( . 2 , 1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , 1 , t i t i t i t i i t i t i c T b Y Y µ µ − + − + = − X X         (7) 
Considering those households that did not borrow from the VRF in 2002, a regression of the differenced 
outcome variable on the treatment variable (which equals 1 for those who borrowed from the VRF in 2004) 
and the change in the covariates should estimate the impact, while “sweeping away” the effects of 
unobservable or mismeasured (but time-invariant) covariates.  The results of this exercise are shown in the 
middle panel of Table 12, which shows little to no impact of the VRF on expenditure (impact of 2.0% but t-
statistic of 1.04), income, or even farm or non-farm income.   
  To check the robustness of these results, before computing the double differences we first estimated 
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differencing to the area of common support.  We weighted the differences for each treated case (i.e. VRF 
borrower) by 1, and each comparison case by p/(1-p) – where p is the propensity score – as recommended by 
Imbens (2004; also Ravallion 2006). The results, shown in the bottom panel of Table 12, were similar to those 
of the unweighted, unconstrained estimates: there is a hint of an impact on expenditure per capita, and on 
non-farm income per capita, but none of the effects are statistically significant at the conventional levels. 
  It is also possible to confine the double differencing to those who did not borrow in 2004 (and look 
at the effects of borrowing  in 2002); or to those who did borrow in 2002 (and look at the effects of 
continuing to borrow in 2004).i
 
  None of the results in these cases (not shown here) were statistically 
significant. 
Panel Instrumental Variables 
 
As a final exercise we undertook an  instrumental variables analysis using the (rural) panel data and 
incorporating household fixed effects.  The linear first-stage equation uses, as instruments, the presence of a 
VRF in the village, this measure multiplied by the educational level of the household head, and the size of the 
village multiplied by the educational level of the head.  The full equations, for the case where the outcome is 
the log of expenditure per capita and the comparison is between those who borrowed from the VRF in 2004 
and those who borrowed neither in 2002 nor in 2004, are shown in Appendix Table A2. 
  The key results are summarized in table 13.  Households that borrowed from the VRF in 2004 had 
15% more income and 18% more expenditure than those who borrowed in neither year, holding other 
influences constant; these increases are statistically significant, but also rather large.  If, instead, the 
comparison is between those who borrowed both in 2002 and 2004 and those who borrowed only in 2004, 
the impact of the second year of borrowing was to raise income by 8% and spending by 10%.  These 
statistically significant rises are within the bounds of plausibility. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
This study of the impact of the Thailand Village Fund is based entirely on data from the socio-economic 
surveys of 2002 and 2004, undertaken just one and three years after the VRF was launched.  In the absence of 
random assignment, we were obliged to use quasi-experimental methods to quantify the effect of the VRF on 
outcome variables.  The propensity score matching approach generates reasonable results:  the Village 
Revolving Fund does appear to have had an impact, raising expenditures by 3.3% and income by 1.9% in 
2004.  These results are tolerably robust to most specifications of matching, and we may interpret these 
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   By and large the other results – based on using instrumental variables on cross-section data, double 
differences, and instrumental variables using a rural panel – do not contradict the propensity score matching 
results.  The instrumental variables estimates suggest that the marginal impact of the VRF may be small, even 
though, based on the propensity score matching, the average  impact is more substantial.  The double 
difference results show little effect, but the instrumental variables analysis with household fixed effects shows 
a surprisingly large impact of VRF borrowing in rural areas. 
  Our interpretation of these findings is that the VRF has indeed had a moderate impact on household 
spending, and also (but to a lesser extent) on household income; this is consistent with our expectations, 
based on theory. 
Further investigation shows a number of interesting patterns.  First, most of the effect of VRF 
borrowing is concentrated in the poorest quintile of the population (as measured by expenditure per capita), 
where it raised spending by 5.2%, making the program markedly pro-poor.  Second, the effect of the VRF 
appears to work most convincingly through its influence on farm income, suggesting that it is credit-
constrained farmers who have best been able to put the loans to productive use.  This is not what the 
designers of the Fund had envisaged; instead they had expected that it would boost household-level non-farm 
enterprise (and there is some, if modest, evidence of this too).  We speculate that the short-term nature of the 
VRF loans makes them suitable for farmers – they allow for the financing of inputs during a crop cycle – but 
are not sufficiently long-term (or perhaps large) enough to be very useful for most of the other remunerative 
activities that households might initiate. 
  The third interesting finding is that there are synergies between VRF and BAAC loans; borrowing 
from one or the other alone has only a modest discernible impact on incomes or even expenditure, in 
contrast to the large impact associated with borrowing from both sources.  This has some important practical 
implications.  The BAAC should be slow to withdraw from village-level lending, even if it is tempted to do so 
by a perception that the VRF can fill the gap; or alternatively, the BAAC should be sure to channel enough 
resources via the VRF to allow it to fill the gap adequately.  Our results also suggest that if the government 
wants to expand the VRF, the most productive approach would be to target poorer farming communities.  
  Finally, a caveat.  Our results do not allow one to make a judgment about the desirability of the VRF.  
That would require additional information about the full costs of the program and an evaluation of its 
sustainability.  It would also be valuable to determine whether the impact of the VRF weakens over time, a 
finding that is common elsewhere (e.g. Chen et al. 2006; Khandker 2005). These both require further 
research, which would be particularly desirable given the importance of the Thai experiment with large-scale 
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Table 1. Village Rotating Fund Lending by Village Size 
    Income in 2004, baht per month  Average VRF 
loan/income 
% of households 
borrowing from VRF  Decile  # of households  Per capita  Per household 
1            75         3,588         12,975   7.9            63.6  
2          103         4,163         14,450   4.6            49.3  
3          119         5,342         18,836   2.5            37.0  
4          133         5,012         17,145   2.6            37.8  
5          147         5,431         18,537   2.1            35.7  
6          163         5,317         18,312   2.1            34.6  
7          183         5,006         17,385   2.1            35.7  
8          211         4,966         16,889   2.1            35.6  
9          256         5,071         17,487   1.7            30.5  
10          368         6,120         20,020   1.1            21.3  
Total          175         4,987         17,198   2.7            38.2  
Source: From Thailand Socio-Economic Survey of 2004. 
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Table 2.  Summary of Use of Village Fund, by Adults, 2004 
  All 
Poorest 
fifth*  Rural  Female 
Number of observations (unweighted)  80,950  13,180  30,892  43,916 
Expenditure per capita (baht/month)  3,398  1,060  2,578  3,427 
Income per capita (baht/month)  4,717  1,455  3,345  4,745 
Did you obtain at least one VRF loan since 2002?  (% saying yes)  16.6  20.0  21.5  15.5 
Why did you not 
obtain a loan? 
Number  of observations  69,486  10,820  24,547  38,035 
Applied but was refused (%)  0.7  1.1  0.8  0.7 
No need (%)  28.5  16.0  25.1  28.7 
Believed would be refused (%)  4.1  4.4  3.9  3.9 
Too expensive (%)  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2 
Did not find guarantors (%)  0.9  1.1  0.7  0.8 
Did not like to be in debt (%)  29.5  37.8  33.1  29.7 
Don’t know about VRF (%)  7.7  3.1  2.6  7.7 
Other (%)  28.0  36.1  33.4  28.0 
VRF is not available (%)  0.5  0.0  0.1  0.4 
How much money did you ask to borrow in this loan? (Baht)  17,183  18,236  17,438  16,340 
How much did you actually borrow in this loan? (Baht)  16,183  17,312  16,462  15,322 
Annualized interest rate on the VRF loan (%)  6.0  5.8  5.9  6.1 
What was the main 
(true) objective for 
obtaining this loan 
Number of observations  11,250  2,354  6,298  5,881 
     Buy agricultural equipment/inputs (%)  39.5  44.9  42.2  35.3 
     Buy animals (for sale/use) (%)  9.7  12.3  10.4  8.4 
     Buy agricultural land (%)  1.7  1.6  1.8  1.7 
     Buy non-farm business equipment/inputs (%)  10.3  3.6  8.9  11.6 
     Business construction (%)  3.6  1.3  3.0  4.2 
     Buy consumer durables (%)  1.4  2.0  1.3  1.6 
     Improve dwelling (%)  4.8  4.3  4.4  4.6 
     School fees (%)  4.0  2.1  3.4  4.7 
     Health treatment (%)  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.9 
     Ceremonies (%)  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
     On-lending (%)  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.9 
     Other (%)  23.4  27.1  23.0  25.6 
     Not reported (%)  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.2 
Were you overdue in repaying this loan? (% saying yes)  7.7  7.9  7.5  7.9 
Did you borrow from somewhere else in order to repay this loan? (% 
saying yes)  16.1  18.9  16.6  16.8 
What rate of interest did you have to pay on this other loan? (% per 
annum)  46.0  44.2  43.9  49.6 
How  did this loan 
change your 
economic situation 
     Improved (%)  71.1  70.9  71.7  70.9 
     Unchanged (%)  27.0  27.2  26.4  27.0 
     Worsened (%)  1.9  2.0  1.9  2.2 
Why was your loan 
application refused? 
Number of observations  249  62  96  123 
     No funds left  (%)  39.1  40.5  43.7  32.5 
     Application incomplete (%)  8.2  8  8.6  5.2 
     No guarantors (%)  19.2  19.8  14.9  20.8 
     Other (%)  30.9  31.6  30.4  40.0 
     Not reported or unknown (%)  2.6  0.1  2.5  1.5 
If refused, did you obtain a loan from other sources instead? (% saying 
yes)  45.0  38.7  46.7  52.6 
How should the 




     No changes needed  30.2  28.3  31.5  30.4 
     No guarantors  13.4  12.5  12.3  13.1 
     Higher  loan amounts  33.6  36.7  36.3  33.1 
     Longer repayment periods  33.9  40.8  38.2  33.4 
     Lower interest/grants  36.9  40.9  38.5  37.1 
     Repayment in kind  4.9  6.5  5.5  5.0 
     Should give money only to the poorest  25.2  22.3  21.5  25.6 
     Other  6.7  5.2  5.3  6.8 
Source:  Thailand Socioeconomic Survey 2004. 
Note.  Unit of observation is an adult (aged 20 or older).  Sampling weights were used in all cases.  * Poorest quintile as measured by 
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Table 3.  Summary of Variables Used in Propensity Score Analysis for 2004 
   Full sample  VRF borrowers 
Propensity Score 
Equation 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Coefficient  p-value 
Does household borrow from VRF? (Yes=1)  0.38   0.49   1.00      -        
Age of head (in years)  49.67   14.84   50.37   13.16   0.017  0.00 
Educational level of head (in years)  7.09   4.39   6.09   3.18   0.100  0.00  
Head of household is male (yes=1)  0.70   0.46   0.74   0.44   -0.048  0.05 
Number of adult males in household  1.09   0.71   1.17   0.71   -0.153  0.00  
Number of adult females in household  1.27   0.70   1.33   0.63   -0.136  0.00  
Number of males working in agriculture  0.45   0.65   0.68   0.70   -0.042  0.42 
Number of males working in industry  0.20   0.46   0.17   0.43   -0.113  0.03 
Number of males working in trade  0.13   0.39   0.10   0.34   -0.241  0.00  
Number of males working in services  0.20   0.44   0.15   0.39   -0.095  0.07 
Number of females working in agriculture  0.44   0.60   0.69   0.64   0.053  0.30 
Number of females working in industry  0.17   0.42   0.15   0.39   -0.118  0.02 
Number of females working in trade  0.13   0.39   0.11   0.35   -0.196  0.00  
Number of females working in services  0.21   0.48   0.15   0.39   -0.127  0.01 
Municipal area (yes=1)  0.33   0.47   0.12   0.33   -0.452  0.00 
Province 1 (metro Bangkok)          -0.660  0.00 
province2          -0.238  0.06 
province3          -0.173  0.154 
…             
Age of household head (in years ’00), squared  2,688   1,556   2,710   1,381   -1.935  0.00  
Educational level of head (in years), squared  69.55   83.77   47.18   54.97   -0.006  0.00  
One-person household  0.10   0.31   0.04   0.20   -0.257  0.00  
Household with two parents  0.67   0.47   0.75   0.43   0.097  0.00 
Household with one parent  0.10   0.30   0.09   0.29   -0.074  0.03 
Household has 30 baht medical card  0.83   0.38   0.93   0.26   0.223  0.00  
Household gets lunch or food subsidy  0.24   0.43   0.34   0.48   0.068  0.00 
Size of household  3.45   1.66   3.84   1.61   0.100  0.00  
Head of household is self-employed  0.48   0.50   0.65   0.48   -2.146  0.00  
Head  of household is an employee  0.34   0.47   0.23   0.42   -2.351  0.00  
Head of household has another employment  0.18   0.39   0.12   0.33   -2.211  0.00  
Number of earners in household  1.94   1.07   2.21   1.03   0.247  0.00  
1/(number of households per village or block)  0.00694  0.0031  0.00775  0.0034  29.810  0.00 
Constant          0.395  0.57 
Memo: Outcome variables             
Household current income, baht/capita per mth  4,987   7,119   3,209   3,385   Pseudo R2  0.190 




0.985  Household farm income, baht/capita per month  522  1,809  785  2,048 
Household non-farm income, baht/capita per mth  3,964  6,780  2,065  2,855 
Percentage rise in income since 2002  0.55   15.09   0.32   16.32      
Number of observations  34,843  10,985  34,752 
Source: Thailand socioeconomic survey, 2004. 
Note: Means are weighted to take structure of sampling into account.  
 Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 26 of 34 
 
 











  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
2004 
  Means 
Whole sample  3,622  7.88  4,987  8.08 
VRF borrowers   2,549  7.63  3,209  7.79 
Not VRF borrowers  4,286  8.04  6,088  8.26 
  Matched comparisons 
Full sample 
VRF-not VRF  -36.4  0.033  -228.0  0.019 
t  [n=10,957]  -0.59  2.67  -2.32  1.27 
Rural households only 
VRF-not VRF  48.0  0.069  -10.0  0.043 
t [n=6,051]  0.55  3.79  -0.09  1.98 
Panel households only 
VRF-not VRF  59.2  0.043  68.7  0.056 
t [n=2,459]  0.45  1.44  0.39  1.59 
2002 
  Means 
Whole sample  3,131  7.75  4,446  7.94 
VRF borrowers   2,044  7.46  2,660  7.61 
Not VRF borrowers  3,529  7.85  5,102  8.06 
  Matched comparisons 
Full sample 
VRF-not VRF  -28.94  0.026  -205.92  0.031 
t  [n=10,957]  -0.65  2.15  -2.33  1.90 
Rural households only 
VRF-not VRF  10.4  0.031  -242.0  0.012 
t [n=6,051]  0.20  1.93  -2.04  0.58 
Panel households only 
VRF-not VRF  103.0  0.073  -2.5  0.071 
t [n=2,459]  1.44  2.83  -0.02  2.13 
Source: Based on data from Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004.   
Notes:  * Minimum values of ln(farm income per capita) and ln(non-farm income per 
capita) were set equal to 0.   




Table 5.  Propensity Score Matching by Quintile for ln(expenditure per capita) 
  2004  2002 
  VRF – not 
VRF 
t-statistic  VRF – not 
VRF 
t-statistic 
Effects by expenditure per capita quintile         
Quintile 1 (poorest)  0.052  4.87  0.036  3.59 
Quintile 2  0.007  1.56  0.004  0.84 
Quintile 3  -0.005  -1.33  -0.005  -1.17 
Quintile 4  0.007  1.42  -0.009  -1.37 
Quintile 5 (richest)  -0.044  -1.92  -0.047  -1.81 




Table 6.  The Effect of VRF Borrowing on Household Durable Assets, Based on the Propensity 
Score Matching Model  
  Sample means  Matched comparisons 




VRF - non 
VRF 
t-statistic 
2004           
HH has VCR  0.60  0.61  0.60  0.036  4.04 
HH has fridge  0.80  0.82  0.78  0.045  6.56 
HH has washing machine  0.36  0.33  0.39  0.049  5.36 
HH has phone  0.64  0.59  0.67  0.057  6.54 
HH has motorized transport  0.74  0.84  0.68  0.047  6.66 
HH uses Internet  0.18  0.12  0.21  0.003  0.42 
2002           
HH has VCR  0.38  0.40  0.31  0.018  1.81 
HH has fridge  0.76  0.76  0.77  0.060  7.14 
HH has washing machine  0.29  0.32  0.22  0.020  2.05 
HH has phone  0.40  0.45  0.26  0.020  2.01 
HH has motorized transport  0.70  0.67  0.79  0.048  5.58 
HH uses Internet  0.03  0.04  0.00  -0.006  -2.71 
Source:  Based on data from the Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004. 
Note:  For 2004, the number of treatment households is 10,957 and the propensity score equation is based on a total sample of 
34,843; for 2003 there were 7,238 treatment households (i.e. who borrowed from the VRF) out of a total sample of 34,785 
households.  The sample means are weighted to reflect the sampling design. 
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Table 7. Robustness Checks for Propensity Score Matching Results 
    VRF – not VRF  t-statistic  # treated 
  Propensity Score Matching, full data set using 
provincial dummies 
     
  Impact on ln(expenditure per capita)       
1  Nearest neighbor (base case)  0.033  2.67  10,957 
2  Stratification matching  0.042  5.47  10,957 
    Kernel matching       
3    A:  Gaussian  0.018  2.51*  10,957 
4    B:  Epanechnikov  0.045  5.67*  10,957 
5  Radius (caliper) matching, radius = 0.001  -0.182  -22.59  10,884 
    Rural dataset using regional dummies       
6  Propensity Score Matching  0.076  4.39  6,051 
7  Direct (“Covariate”) Matching  0.013  1.02   
  Breakdown by sources of income       
8  Ln(expenditure per capita)  0.033  2.67  10,957 
9  Ln(income per capita)  0.190  1.27  10,957 
10  Ln(wage income per capita)  0.095  1.41  10,957 
11  Ln(non-farm enterprise income/capita)  0.256  3.87  10,957 
12  Ln(farm income/capita)  0.493  8.87  10,957 
13  Ln(transfer income/capita)  0.050  0.93  10,957 
14  Ln(other income/capita)  0.133  3.20  10,957 
  Breakdown by consumption category       
15    Grain  7.69  4.48  10,957 
16    Dairy  -0.27  -0.15  10,957 
17    Meat  10.07  3.29  10,957 
18    Alcohol (consumed at home)  2.06  0.84  10,957 
19    Alcohol (consumed outside home)  -3.23  1.05  10,957 
20    Fuel  -1.88  -0.71  10,957 
21    Tobacco  1.97  1.31  10,957 
22    Ceremonies  9.47  1.28  10,957 
23    Home furnishings  1.15  1.06  10,957 
24    Vehicle operation & maintenance  12.42  1.51  10,957 
25    Clothes  2.37  0.44  10,957 
26    Education  -1.79  -0.58  10,957 
  Excluding villages with <50 and ≥500 
households 
     
27  Ln(expenditure per capita)  0.048  3.97  10,818 
28  Ln(income per capita)  0.037  2.52  10,818 
  Male head of household       
29  Ln(expenditure per capita)  0.052  3.55  7,918 
30  Ln(income per capita)  0.048  2.71  7,918 
  Female head of household       
31  Ln(expenditure per capita)  0.050  2.31  3,039 
32  Ln(income per capita)  0.028  1.11  3,039 
Source: Based on data from Thailand Socio-Economic Surveys of 2002 and 2004. 
Note: * Based on bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications. 
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Table 8. Rosenbaum Bounds for the Impact of VRF Borrowing on the Log of Expenditure per Capita, Based 
on Propensity Score Matching, Thailand 2004 
    Confidence Interval 
Γ  Critical p-value  Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
1  0.0000  0.021  0.045 
1.025  0.0004  0.013  0.054 
1.05  0.0123  0.004  0.062 
1.075  0.1185  -0.003  0.070 
1.10  0.4437  -0.011  0.078 
Notes and Sources: Based on data from Thailand Socioeconomic Survey of 2004.  For definition of Γ, see text, and also DiPrete and 
Gangl (2004); Γ=1 assumes no hidden bias.  Estimation used the rbounds command in Stata written by Markus Gangl. The 





Table 9. Estimates of Treatment Effects from Common Impact Model 
Outcome variable  Measure of treatment  Coefficient  t-statistic  p-value  Adj. R2  Observations 
Ln(expenditure/capita)  Borrows from VRF  0.023  3.7  0.00  0.56  34,752 
Ln(income/capita)  Borrows from VRF  0.0002  0.0  0.98  0.58  34,752 
Expenditure/capita  VRF borrowing  0.827  8.4  0.00  0.24  10,735 
Income/capita  VRF borrowing  1.425  10.5  0.00  0.30  10,735 
Ln(expenditure/capita)  Ln(VRF borrowing)  0.144  16.6  0.00  0.46  10,735 
Ln(income/capita)  Ln(VRF borrowing)  0.175  17.0  0.00  0.48  10,735 
Source: Based on data from Thailand Socio-Economic Survey of 2004. 
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(unweighted)    Level  Log  Level  Log 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (7) 
  Means 
Whole sample  3,622  7.88  4,987  8.08  34,843 
Borrow from VRF  2,549  7.63  3,209  7.79  10,985 
Borrow from VRF but not BAAC  2,724  7.68  3,396  7.83  7,268 
Borrow from BAAC  2,378  7.58  3,107  7.75  5,624 
Borrow from  BAAC but not VRF  2,656  7.66  3,463  7.82  2,854 
Borrow from BAAC and VRF  2,292  7.56  2,934  7.73  3,717 
Borrow from neither VRF nor BAAC   4,486  8.09  6,390  8.31  21,951 
  Matched Comparisons 
  Level  Log  Level  Log   
Borrow from BAAC (and possibly others) 
BAAC-not BAAC  124.16  0.065  25.79  0.061  34,843 
t-statistic  1.88  4.46  0.22  3.40   
Borrow from BAAC (but not from VRF) 
BAAC-not BAAC  45.95  0.036  -29.01  0.038  34,843 
t-statistic  0.41  1.63  -0.14  1.40   
Borrow from VRF (but not from BAAC) 
VRF-not VRF  9.38  0.021  -98.67  0.015  34,843 
t-statistic  0.15  1.67  -1.05  0.97   
Borrow from TVC and BAAC 
BAAC+VRF-not BAAC or VRF  190.4  0.091  150.2  0.085  34,843 









  Level  Log  Level  Log 
  Means 
Whole sample  3,130  7.75  4,446  7.94  34,785 
Borrow from VRF  2,044  7.46  2,660  7.60  7,243 
Borrow from VRF but not BAAC  2,111  2.48  2,733  7.62  4,760 
Borrow from BAAC  2,018  7.43  2,724  7.59  5,326 
Borrow from  BAAC but not VRF  2,098  7.44  2,911  7.61  2,843 
Borrow from BAAC and VRF  1,942  7.43  2,547  7.58  2,483 
Borrow from neither VRF nor BAAC   4,486  8.09  6,390  8.31  21,951 
  Matched Comparisons 
  Level  Log  Level  Log   
Borrow from BAAC (and possibly others) 
BAAC-not BAAC  125.79  0.061  131.11  0.098  34,785 
t-statistic  2.68  4.42  1.06  5.26   
Borrow from BAAC (but not from VRF) 
BAAC-not BAAC  112.12  0.043  99.10  0.057  34,785 
t-statistic  1.84  2.54  0.59  2.49   
Borrow from VRF (but not from BAAC) 
VRF-not VRF  -178.54  -0.027  -378.17  -0.028  34,785 
t-statistic  3.37  -1.97  -3.15  -1.57   
Borrow from TVC and BAAC 
BAAC+VRF-not BAAC or VRF  122.9  0.071  8.6  0.077  34,785 
t-statistic  2.3  4.2  0.1  3.3   
Source:  Based on data from Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004. 
Notes:  * Minimum value of ln(farm income per capita) and ln(non-farm income per capita) set equal to 0 in all 
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Table 11.  Instrumental Variable Estimates Using Data for 2004 and 2002 









   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
2004  Means 
Whole sample  3,622  4,987  522  3,964 
Borrow from VRF  2,549  3,209  785  2,065 
Do not borrow from VRF  4,286  6,088  360  5,140 
  Impacts (in log form) 
Instrument: nhinv         
  Full sample, two-step estimator  0.016  0.017  0.49  0.43 
    z-statistic  (n=34752)  0.36  0.33  2.47  3.60 
  Rural sample, two-step estimator  -0.237  -0.082  1.778  -0.057 
    z-statistic  (n=12858)  -4.89  -1.46  8.28  -0.36 
Checks for robustness         
Instruments: nhinv, anydebt         
  Full sample, maximum likelihood estimator  0.196  0.163  0.952  0.176 
    z-statistic  (n=34752)  15.54  10.78  18.79  5.73 
Instruments: nhinv, anydebt         
  Rural sample, two-step estimator  0.172  0.129  0.957  0.128 
   z-statistic  (n=12858)  9.81  6.2  12.29  2.15 
Instruments: nhinv, non-VRF debt         
  Full sample, maximum likelihood estimator  0.464       
   z-statistic  (n=34752)  24.2       
Instruments: nhinv, non-VRF debt, interest rate         
  Full sample, two-step estimator  0.620  0.543     
   z-statistic  (n=26930)  15.3  12.01     
2002  Means 
Whole sample  3,131  4,446  466  824 
Borrow from VRF  2,044  2,660  746  508 
Do not borrow from VRF  3,529  5,102  364  940 
  Impacts (in log form) 
Instrument: nhinv.           
  Full sample, two-step estimator  0.099  0.084  0.310  -0.183 
    z-statistic  (n=34759)  2.55  1.69  1.37  -1.04 
  Rural sample, two-step estimator  -0.176  -0.098  0.002  0.181 
   z-statistic  (n=13209)  -3.30  -1.42  -0.01  0.52 
Source:  Based on data from Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004. 
Notes:  nhinv is the inverse of the number of households per village.  Non-VRF debt is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a 
household has debt that is not from the VRF.  anydebt equals 1 if a household has debt from any source, and is 0 otherwise.  
The equations for the full-sample two-step estimator using nhinv, for 2004, are shown in Appendix 1. 




Table 12.  Double Difference Estimates of Impact of TVF Borrowing Using Rural Panel Data 
for 2002 and 2004 









   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Means, 2002 (in 2004 prices) 
Full panel sample  2,370  3,128  710  432 
Households that borrowed in 2004, not in 2002  2,300  3,203  678  429 
Households that do not borrow in 2002 or 2004  2,529  3,381  582  459 
  Impacts (in log form) 
Unweighted, using full panel data*         
  Impact  0.020  0.003  -0.075  0.034 
  t-statistic  1.04  0.15  -1.24  0.34 
  Sample size  3,335  3,335  1,370  652 
Weighted, using data in area of common support**         
  Impact  0.021  -0.000  -0.041  0.111 
  t-statistic  1.18  -0.01  -0.69  1.15 
  Number of positive observations  3,327  3,327  1,368  650 
Source:  Based on panel component of Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004 (which covers rural areas only). 
Notes:  * Coefficient from regression of log change in value (e.g. income) on borrowing, controlling for the log changes in the  
same covariates as in Table 3.  The full panel has 5,054 observations, but only households that did not borrow in 2002 were 
included in the estimation; missing or negative values further reduced the estimation sample slightly.  ** As for the unweighted 
results, except that in this case a propensity score (p) was first estimated and used to confine the comparison to the area of 




Table 13.  Instrumental Variables Estimates Using Rural Panel Data for 2002 and 2004 






   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Panel data sample:  Means, 2002 and 2004 
Whole sample  2,457  3,179  714 
Borrow from VRF in 2002 only  2,499  2,951  621 
Borrow from VRF in 2004 only  2,376  3,179  712 
Borrow from VRF in 2002 and 2004  2,259  2,904  928 
Borrow from VRF in neither 2002 nor 2004  2,632  3,413  575 
  Impacts (in log form) 
VRF borrowing in 2004 vs. no VRF borrowing*       
  IV panel estimate  0.179  0.152  0.459 
  z-statistic  3.19  2.24  1.93 
VRF borrowing in 2004 vs. VRF borrowing in both years       
  IV panel estimate  0.096  0.082  0.315 
  z-statistic  2.91  2.02  1.95 
Source:  Based on (rural) panel components of Thailand Socioeconomic Surveys of 2002 and 2004. 
Note:  * Hausman test  of systematic difference in coefficients between IV and OLS: χ2(24)=2.99, for a probability > 0.9999.  
Full regression results are shown in Appendix 2.  Identifying instrument is the inverse of the number of households per village. 
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Appendix Table A1.  Estimates for Instrumental Variables Equations (Probit first-stage and Linear 






  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Does household borrow from VRF? (Yes=1)      0.016  0.36 
Age of head (in years)  0.017  4.85  0.023  19.82 
Educational level of head (in years)  0.100  13.53  0.031  11.72 
Head of household is male (yes=1)  -0.048  -1.95  0.007  0.80 
Number of adult males in household  -0.153  -6.73  0.048  6.14 
Number of adult females in household  -0.136  -7.04  0.059  8.78 
Number of males working in agriculture  -0.042  -0.81  -0.014  -0.82 
Number of males working in industry  -0.113  -2.14  0.075  4.34 
Number of males working in trade  -0.241  -4.50  0.134  7.60 
Number of males working in services  -0.095  -1.79  0.128  7.41 
Number of females working in agriculture  0.053  1.04  -0.032  -1.93 
Number of females working in industry  -0.118  -2.27  0.054  3.15 
Number of females working in trade  -0.196  -3.79  0.120  7.05 
Number of females working in services  -0.127  -2.53  0.133  8.24 
Municipal area (yes=1)  -0.452  -25.54  0.092  10.35 
Province 1 (metro Bangkok)  -0.660  -6.59  0.389  13.03 
province2  -0.238  -1.88  0.246  6.37 
province3  -0.173  -1.42  0.370  9.90 
…         
Age of household head (in years ’00), squared  0.000  -5.71  0.000  -19.30 
Educational level of head (in years), squared  -0.006  -16.53  0.001  9.25 
One-person household  -0.257  -6.84  0.290  24.71 
Household with two parents  0.097  3.36  -0.040  -4.18 
Household with one parent  -0.074  -2.25  0.016  1.46 
Household has 30 baht medical card  0.223  9.01  -0.222  -28.23 
Household gets lunch or food subsidy  0.068  3.22  -0.107  -14.04 
Size of household  0.100  11.51  -0.134  -41.14 
Number of earners  0.247  5.27  -0.010  -0.63 
Head of household is self-employed  -2.146  -4.02  -0.199  -1.34 
Head  of household is an employee  -2.351  -4.40  -0.296  -1.98 
Head of household has another employment  -2.211  -4.14  -0.153  -1.02 
1/(number of households per village or block)  29.810  10.47     
Constant  0.395  0.73  7.630  50.04 
Memo items         
Wald χ2 (203)      50544  p=0.00 
Λ  0.004  0.15     
Source: Thailand socioeconomic survey, 2004. 
Note: nhinv is the inverse of the number of households  in the village.  Village Fund, draft of June 29, 2009    Page 34 of 34 
 
Appendix Table A2.  Estimated Equations for the Panel Instrumental Variables Analysis for ln(expenditure per 
capita), VRF Borrowers in 2004 vs. Non-Borrowers 
  First-stage equation  Second-stage equation 
 
Coeffi-
cient  t-statistic  p-value 
Coeffi-
cient  t-statistic  p-value 
Did household borrow from VRF? (Yes=1)        0.179  3.19  0.001 
Age of head (in years)  0.010  1.59  0.113  0.011  1.81  0.070 
Educational level of head (in years)  0.048  3.53  0.000  0.002  0.20  0.840 
Head of household is male (yes=1)  -0.120  -3.13  0.002  0.044  1.16  0.245 
Number of adult males in household  0.030  1.31  0.189  -0.065  -2.94  0.003 
Number of adult females in household  -0.012  -0.55  0.582  -0.161  -7.99  0.000 
Number of males working in agriculture  -0.135  -2.28  0.022  -0.170  -2.96  0.003 
Number of males working in industry  -0.068  -1.12  0.262  -0.121  -2.06  0.039 
Number of males working in trade  -0.094  -1.49  0.138  -0.110  -1.82  0.069 
Number of males working in services  -0.090  -1.54  0.124  -0.041  -0.72  0.469 
Number of females working in agriculture  -0.100  -1.72  0.086  -0.119  -2.11  0.035 
Number of females working in industry  -0.121  -2.00  0.046  -0.044  -0.75  0.455 
Number of females working in trade  -0.083  -1.32  0.186  -0.091  -1.51  0.131 
Number of females working in services  -0.039  -0.66  0.508  -0.056  -0.99  0.320 
Age of household head (in years ’000), squared  -0.032  -0.58  0.560  -0.107  -2.02  0.043 
Educational level of head (in years ‘000), 
squared  -0.015  -0.03  0.980  0.312  0.54  0.590 
One-person household  -0.042  -0.96  0.336  0.313  7.51  0.000 
Household with two parents  -0.012  -0.31  0.756  -0.144  -3.94  0.000 
Household with one parent  -0.085  -2.25  0.025  -0.014  -0.37  0.710 
Household has 30 baht medical card  0.082  3.07  0.002  -0.089  -3.38  0.001 
Household gets lunch or food subsidy  0.107  5.44  0.000  -0.027  -1.31  0.192 
Head of household is self-employed  0.997  2.65  0.008  0.424  1.16  0.247 
Head  of household is an employee  0.958  2.55  0.011  0.418  1.14  0.253 
Head of household has another employment  0.925  2.47  0.014  0.392  1.08  0.282 
Number of earners in household  0.111  1.98  0.047  0.136  2.52  0.012 
Village size × Educational level of head × 1000  -0.128  -2.96  0.003       
Is there a VRF in village? (yes=1)  0.364  10.17  0.000       
VRF in village × Educational level of head  -0.005  -0.90  0.367       
Constant  -1.668  -4.23  0.000  7.312  18.88  0.000 
Memo items:             
Hausman χ2              5.03  1.00 
Number of observations  6,674           
F-test of coefficients  17.93  (27,3308)  0.00       
Wald χ2 test        3,007,000  (25)  0.00 
F-test that ui=0  0.79 
(3338,3308




R2:  within / between / overall  0.127  0.016  0.042  0.099  0.186  0.168 







                                                            
i From the panel of 5,054 households, we have the following breakdown of the number of households: 
 
  Did not borrow from VRF in 2004  Borrowed from VRF in 2004 
Did not borrow from VRF in 2002  2,291  1,048 
Borrowed from the  VRF in 2002  303  1,412 
 